hold has it over the individual when conflicting with his own interest? Why ought it to be sought? But the notion of obligation is not to be expected from pure utilitarianism, since Bentham holds that the term 'ought' should be banished from ethics as meaningless and confusing.[1] The end must, therefore, have some attractive power in itself to draw men's wills toward its realization. But, according to their theory, this end can only appeal to men through pleasure, which, as individual, can only be estimated by the individual. If, then, a man does not feel desirous of promoting the greatest happiness of any one beyond himself, he is at liberty to act as he pleases, since there exists no common principle to which appeal may be made. His desires will form his only rule of action. If his own happiness and that of others cannot be shown to be identical, which is possible only under pre-suppositions destructive of utilitarian or hedonistic position, there seems no way of advancing from the one to the many. To claim that, from the point of view of a disinterested observer, one person's happiness counts for no more than that of another, and hence a man should not seek his own more than that of his neighbor, is quite true considered in reference to this supposed impartial observer. But the very point at issue is that the individual is not disinterested, but has the strongest personal regard for himself, and sees no reason for assuming the impartial position save for reasons other than those furnished by pleasure. It may be claimed that it is intuitively known that the greatest happiness is the ultimate end, and hence men are bound to seek it, but this necessity must be founded either on reason or desire. If the former, some other principle than pleasure has been introduced; if the latter, the individual happiness must be shown to coincide with the common. This weakness of the utilitarian position, which Professor Sidgwick declares fatal unless theology or metaphysics can offer proof of the required identity[2] – this weakness forms the strength of Kant. So long as ethics remains content with what is, and does not seek to examine the conditions and nature of what
