lay no claim to be the moral ideal, the best, for it is not so good as the satisfaction of all the desires of that person and of some one else. The multitude of personal ideals stand in subordination to the great ideal which includes them and in which they are reduced to unity. It alone, therefore, is on this theory the moral end.
To this the rejoinder is that the satisfaction of two desires is shown to be better than that of one; in one sense when both desires belong to the same person, and in another sense when they belong to different persons. The satisfaction of two of one's desires is better than that of either of them singly in the sense that one values it more highly. The satisfaction of two desires belonging one to one person and one to another is better than that of either desire singly, not in the sense that it is valued more highly, but in the sense that it is valued more times, valued by more people. If this difference is not plain enough already, it may be made so in this way: Suppose that there are four pictures and three critics; and that the critics agree that the first picture is second best, but are totally at variance about the other three, one holding the second one is best, one the third, and the other one the fourth. Then the first picture is better than either of the other three in the sense that it is valued by more people, and either of the other three are both better and worse than the first, in the sense that each of them is valued both more highly by the critic who thinks it the best, and less highly by the other two who think it one of the worst.
Well, then, the argument runs, if the satisfaction of one desire is in and of itself good, the satisfaction of two desires is better; in one sense if both desires belong to the same person, in another sense if they belong to different persons. From this the only thing that follows is, that the satisfaction of all my desires is, in one sense, the best, the ideal, and in another sense is not the best, is not so good as the satisfaction of all my desires and those of some one else besides. It is not possible to reach a single standard along this line. The individual ideals are not reduced to a unity in the general ideal,
