Side by side with this, as the second basis of religion, we have the presence of the moral law with its consequences,—belief in God and immortality. The moral law commands, on Block's view, the doing of that whereby one becomes worthy of happiness.)
747) Born, Fr. Glo.: Ueber den transscendentalen Idealismus. In the N. Ph. Mg. I, 3, pp. 360-372. I, 4, pp. 459-463. (Difference between Schein and Erscheinung, empirical and transcendental idealism. Foundation and defence of the latter, principally on the ground of physiological facts.)
748) Born: Erinnerung gegen die Recension des ersten und zweyten Stücks dieses Magazins in den Tübingischen gelehrten Anzeigen vom Jahr 1790, 37. Stück, S. 290 und f. In the N. Ph. Mg. I, 4, pp. 609-616.
749) Born: Ueber die Analogie der Logik und Aesthetik. In the N. Ph. Mg. II, 1-2, pp. 205-212. (Born shares the view of Kant, expressed in R. Va. and R. Vb., that Aesthetics is only subjectively of general validity, and, therefore, neither is nor can become a science. The supposed analogy between it and logic is, therefore, totally without foundation.)
749a, b) Born. Cf. nos. 570, 659.
750-758, Brastberger.
750) Brastberger, Gbh. Ulr.: Untersuchungen über Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 8vo. Halle. Gebauer. pp. vi, 430. (Gives, in short paragraphs, a popular paraphrase of the contents of the Kritik, and considers its mistakes in appended Remarks. Regarded, in general, as very acute. I must confess, however, to sharing the opinion of Tiedemann in the A. D. B. [1791, 104, I, S. 212-213, under the title Zb], that it is often a question in its pages of empty word-polemic. Brastberger diverges from Kant most definitely in ascribing the origin of the table of categories to empirical observation, and in basing space, time and categories on "Urdinge," which are absolutely independent of our ideation. These "Urdinge," it is true, cannot be known; cannot even be proved: but our knowledge directs us to them, and we must not, therefore, like Kant, refuse to accept them. But Kant, of course, does not do this by any means. Brastberger, however, sees phenomena in the 'objects which affect us' of the Introduction to R. Vb.; though it is obvious, from a comparison of parallel passages, that Kant was here thinking of things-in-themselves. This mistake is also charged against Brastberger in the T., 1791, part 49; while, according to the A. L. Z. [1791, III, pp. 345-350], he is right as regards the letter of the Kritik, but wrong as regards the spirit of it,—and in particular as regards the pure spirit, as seen in Reinhold's exposition. Brastberger defended himself against this review in the Preface to no. 757. Since, on his view, the Kritik on the one hand aspires to the determination of the limits of human knowledge, and on the other remains entirely within the field of conscious-
