subjective feeling itself? Suppose we get rid of the sense of duty, would duty have no claims upon us? Is there not, in short, an objective ground of obligation? To all of which it may be answered that, in an organism like human society, if one member be supposed devoid of a sense of obligation, the other members who retain that sense will insist on his compliance with moral standards; and for such a non-moral monster, who does what is required only to escape punishment, duty will seem objectively grounded, though its real source is the subjective feeling experienced by every normal member of the community in the presence of moral laws. There could be no obligation but for this personal recognition of goodness, and the reverent submission it entails. Society may compel, but compulsion is not moral obligation; nor is an objective basis found by substituting God for society. The prospect of divine rewards and penalties may break our wills; but it is not the sense of obligation that is subdued, but the susceptibility to pains and pleasures that is prostrated. If we do not obligate ourselves,—if our consciousness of right does not awaken the feeling of duty,—then nothing else in the world can put us under moral obligation. Let it be granted that God and man may punish wrong-doing; still it is impossible to identify the proposition, "I ought to do this," with the proposition, "God or man will punish me if I do not." The great moral leader often feels that he ought to do precisely what society desires to have left undone; but those who do not believe in divine rewards and punishments may yet have and retain a lively sense of obligation. Furthermore, the consciousness of obligation must, in those who believe in such divine government, constitute, in considerable measure, the ground of that belief. From every point of view, the feeling of moral obligation—"I ought to do the right"—is an ultimate, self-supporting, self-authenticating experience. It is a characteristic of human nature as such. And, since reason is what distinguishes man from lower animals, we may say that the consciousness of obligation is a function of reason itself, as much a part of our being, as little capable of communication from without.
