cedent conditions, the immediate medium of determination is the self; to a very large extent, indeed, the 'I' of to-morrow is determined by the 'I' of to-day, and that by the 'I' of yesterday.
This is true; but if we trace back the 'I' of yesterday through all the preceding yesterdays, according to Miss Ritchie's premises, we reach an 'I' which is merely the result of inheritance and environment, determined for us and not by us, and as this, in turn, with the help of certain added increments of experience, determines every succeeding link in the chain, there is no room here for any essential personality, because there is no room for self-determination. The idea of the power of choice is, however, so wrapped up with the word 'purpose' or 'aim' that we unconsciously retain that idea even when by definition it is destroyed. Hence, when we are told that a man is free because he has an intelligent purpose, we readily assent, not realizing that the word 'purpose' is used in an equivocal sense that gives the statement a false plausibility.
3) There is a logical equivocation in the use of the words 'impulse' and 'freedom.' To quote once more: "Since human knowledge is extremely limited, and men's actions are usually the result, in part, at least, of impulse and habit as well as of reason, it follows that absolute freedom is an ideal rather than a reality. But if the view just suggested be a correct one, it is evident that the more rational a man's actions are the more they correspond to an intelligent survey of all the facts,—the more 'free' is the agent."
Now, impulsive action may mean what is done habitually and mechanically, and with which choice has nothing to do. It may also mean action in accordance with irrational desire, instead of in accordance with intelligent purpose, or, in general, the following of the lower rather than the higher motive, and with this choice may have everything to do.
'Freedom' must mean the power of choice—the power to choose the lower and irrational as well as the higher and rational. Were there freedom to choose but one alternative, there would be no freedom at all. This is the freedom that must belong to the human soul as such, if it is responsible. It is a distinct idea from freedom in the sense of the highest possible development of the human soul, which means a fixed habit of choosing the higher, rational motive rather than the lower and impulsive motive. Freedom in the former sense can be predicated of every man. Freedom in the latter sense can only be predicated of the choice souls of just men made perfect.
What right is there, asks Miss Ritchie in conclusion, in the universe
