totle regarded bilelessness as the cause of longevity. In De Part. An., IV, 2, definite reference is made to bilelessness as the cause of longevity. Now, according to Aristotle's principles, we should not expect enumeration of instances, even when exhaustive, to give absolute certainty. We have not yet transcended the contingency of matter. Nοῦς alone can give absolute certainty, and probably Aristotle held that the action of νοῦς was the final and necessary step to comprehend a universal of causation. In An. Post., I, 5, Aristotle teaches that enumeration of instances, even when complete, does not give absolute certainty.
We come now to a third kind of induction taught by Aristotle. The word ἐπαγωγὴ is still employed. It is the induction of dialectic and is set forth in the Topics.[1] This induction recognises the truth for practical purposes of a universal proposition if many instances support it, and if no negative instance has been found to contradict it. If the respondent in a debate questions the truth of the universal proposition, it rests with him to bring forward a contradictory instance in support of his contention. If he fail to do so, the proposition remains intact.
In conformity with his theories of ἐπαγωγὴ, Aristotle emphasises the importance of paying attention to the facts of experience. "Let us first understand the facts, and then we may seek for their causes."[2] "What could sound more Baconian than the saying with which Aristotle closes his discussion of the process of generation among bees: 'The facts on this subject have not yet been sufficiently ascertained; if ever they are, it will be necessary to trust our senses more than our reasonings, and the latter only when the results are in agreement with the phenomena.'"[3] In Aristotle's De Generatione Animalium there is "more frequent and emphatic protest against inadequate observations, against illicit generalizations and 'empty' generalities, against too far-fetched explanations, against the preference of reasoning to fact, against the arbitrary substitution of plausible conjecture for the actualities of perception."[4] Aristotle lays
- ↑ See particularly I, 18; VIII, 2; VIII, 8.
- ↑ De Part. An., I, 1, 639.
- ↑ Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 1912, Vol. IV, p. 59.
- ↑ Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 165.
