ence is "a simple and childish kind of induction, that proceeds by enumeration alone, and therefore arrives not at necessary, but at uncertain conclusions."[1] " For that Induction of which Logicians speak, which proceeds by simple enumeration, is a puerile matter, concludes uncertainly, is exposed to danger from a single Contradictory Instance, and only looks into subjects to which we are accustomed; nor does it discover the end."[2] Now, these observations are obviously applicable to Aristotle's third kind of induction, the induction of dialectic. And they express much the same views as Aristotle himself held. Aristotle never believed that certainty attached to the induction of dialectic and he clearly recognised the possibility of a contradictory instance. They are virtually applicable also to Aristotle's first kind of induction, the induction supposed to find verification in νοῦς. Aristotle never showed in accordance with what principles νοῦς added its final authority. Are not many of Aristotle's theories of nature, presumably ratified by νοῦς, as a matter of fact false? Bacon's observations are not applicable, of course, to Aristotle's second kind of induction, the Inductive Syllogism. Indeed we have already seen the close resemblance to it of Bacon's own formal method.[3] Even in the case of the Inductive Syllogism there recurs the difficulty attaching to νοῦς. Whom can this faculty now persuade that bilelessness is the cause of longevity?
As a result of our detailed comparison of the philosophies of discovery of Aristotle and Bacon, what general result do we reach? Aristotle collects facts, so does Bacon. Aristotle seems to realise the value of hypothesis, so does Bacon. Aristotle experimented, so did Bacon. Aristotle and Bacon realise the danger of 'opinion,' yet accept it often too uncritically. Aristotle and Bacon indulge in aprioristic argument, although both profess to prefer fact to 'reasoning'.
In regard to actual discovery, Bacon does not seem to hold much, if any, advantage over Aristotle. Bacon anticipated the modern theory of heat as a mode of motion, and, because of the phenomena of friction, rightly rejected the long held notion that
