so to interpret his first principles as to bring his practical conclusions into line with rational morality. This he is able to do because he introduces into his system modifying considerations drawn from the theories he rejects. Why is it often right to curb rather than to indulge impulse? Because reason must be acknowledged as the master of impulse? By no means—reason is always the servant of desire, conscious and unconscious. But it is true that there is an impulse in human nature to seek the good of the whole. This may be identified with the will and since impulses may be fairly called rational according to breadth and scope of the satisfaction they bring this may be called the impulse of reason. Its expression means the fullest possible satisfaction of impulse as a whole, hence the best life. Impulses, furthermore, fall into two classes, possessive and creative. The latter bring the fuller satisfaction because they do not prevent but facilitate the expression of other impulses and tend to create a social order offering more opportunities to all.
Empirical or Common-sense Ethics, as the author understands, has two parts: first, an investigation of what men desire, which is psychological, and, secondly, an enquiry into the conditions under which human desires gain satisfaction, which falls within the field of politics. He therefore discusses in the latter part of his book present-day problems of social and political organizations so far as these affect the self-expression of human individuals. His treatment though brief is thoughtful and frequently suggestive; he is an alert and penetrating critic of current social and political tendencies.
H. W. Wright.
University of Manitoba.
This little book does not profess to be a text-book of ethics, nor does it make any attempt to cover the whole range of topics conventionally presented in introductory ethical works. It is the intention of the author to arouse the interest of the student in the subject and to introduce him to a limited number of fundamental problems. This he attempts to do by presenting in the first half of the book (Parts I and II) a summary and brief criticism of Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals and of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, and by developing in Part III an ethical theory based chiefly upon Aristotle.
Mr. Field conducts his discussion, both in the analytical and the constructive portions of the book, in a dialectical style. The few concrete examples which are employed are decidedly well-chosen and they cause the reader to wish that the pages had been enlivened by a more liberal use of illustrative material. The book is commendably free from dogmatism.
