this: there is one lie a liar cannot tell, namely, to lie that he lied. Only the truthful man can tell this lie, only the truthful man can lyingly call himself a liar.
Hegel adduces in parallel—but not very justly—to this old Elench a modern one from Don Quixote. A rich man built a bridge and a gallows near by it. Every one who came to the bridge was obliged to tell where he was going; if he spoke truly he was allowed to pass, if he lied he would be hung on the gallows. One traveler, when questioned, answered that he was going to be hung on the gallows. At this the bridge-keepers were much puzzled. They would either be hanging him for speaking the truth, or allow him to pass, and so to lie, and yet escape hanging. But the contradiction here is not so much in thought as in language, and arises from "going to the gallows" being a popular condensation for going to the gallows and being hung thereon. By confusing destination with the act at the destination, the clever traveler confused the bridge-keepers and the worthy Sancho himself, to whom the case was referred. The proper reply to fulfill the law would have been: go, hang, if you like, but if you do not go, we will hang you.
The contradiction of penalty and crime herein aimed at, would have been more nearly attained, if a law should have been enacted that every man should truly declare his intention under penalty of being hung. If a man said he intended to be hung, then speaking the truth would involve the penalty for not speaking the truth, and the judge would be in an apparent dilemma. But with strict justice it would seem that the law could hang him at once, for every moment that he remains unhung he is lying. However, if it is his real intent and purpose to get hung, if he has spoken truly, the law must not hang him. But if he has not spoken truly as to his intent to be hung, if he is not thoroughly honest, he must, to satisfy the law, be hung. The quibbler must end on the gallows, but the honest seeker-to-be-hung must not be touched. Again, if the law be that every man shall state truly his intent, and carry it out, or get it carried out, under penalty of being hung, and a man states his intent to be hung, if he does not either hang himself or get hung, the officers must, according to the law, and with perfect justice, hang him.
In whatever way, then, we turn these Liar Elenchs, we see that seeming contradiction is really confusion, which yields to psychological analysis and definition, an instrument which was but too little used by the ancient Sophists and their later followers.
| Hiram M. Stanley. |
| Lake Forest University, |
| Lake Forest, Ill. |
