writings that both Schiller and Kant were Rigorists in the latter sense only.
The first task of philosophy, as a systematic science, is to distinguish clearly the different departments of consciousness, in order to unite them afterwards with a system by means of some element found to be common to them all. So Ethics, in so far as it is methodical, must exclude feeling entirely, and regard the will as determined in its action solely by means of the pure reason speaking through the moral law. But the moral law applies to men, i.e., to beings who are not only rational but also sensuous. When it comes to practice, therefore, our Ethical rigorism must be supplemented by taking into account the part which feeling plays in our moral life. The third part of the article, accordingly, aims at an "aesthetical completion of ethical rigorism," and discusses how far this was attempted by Kant and Schiller respectively.
As the fundamental conceptions of Aesthetics are those of the Sublime and the Beautiful, the Moral is here considered from two points of view, viz., the morally sublime and the morally beautiful. Kant is found to have given due prominence to the former, but in regard to the latter his writings contain only the germs of the thought so fully developed by Schiller. The author's conclusions are summed up by himself as follows: "Ethical Rigorism and Moral Beauty can thus be united; both have been shown to have their justification and their peculiar sphere, the former in the field of pure reason and under the imposition of moral law, the latter in the field of phenomena and in connection with the actual practice of moral duty."
A. R. Hill.
In order to arrive at a satisfactory theory of human well-being, we must study the history of social progress. We cannot understand the life of the individual except in relation to the larger life of society. Moreover, we must bear in mind that society is a living organism. It is passing through a series of transformations, in virtue of which it is ever reaching a higher degree of complexity. This necessitates, on the part of some of its members, a loss of previous occupations and consequent suffering, until an adjustment to the new state of things can be effected. The changes are without doubt beneficial to society as a whole, but this benefit can be secured only at the
