THE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF RICHARD CUMBERLAND. I.[1]
WHILE the doctrine of Universalistic Hedonism has played a most conspicuous part in English Ethics since the time of Paley and Bentham, it is not commonly realized that the essential features of the system were stated and developed by a contemporary of the Cambridge Platonists. It is true that Cumberland's treatise, De legibus naturae, like most ethical works of the time, was largely controversial in character, being written to refute Hobbes. Moreover, the jural aspect of the system, implied by the very title of the treatise, tends to obscure what for us is by far its most important feature. And even this is not all. The 'common good' which Cumberland regarded as the end of all truly moral action, includes 'perfection' as well as 'happiness,' which leads to serious confusion in the working out of the system. But, making all allowances for what was incidental in the external form of the work, and
- ↑ The present article and that which is to follow in the next number of the Review are based upon the first division of a thesis, entitled The Beginnings of English Utilitarianism, presented in June, 1894, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. A word should be said regarding the relation of my own treatment of Cumberland to that of Dr. Frank E. Spaulding, in Richard Cumberland als Begründer der englischen Ethik (Leipzig, 1894). I had completed my own study of Cumberland's system before I knew of this dissertation. Before putting my results in final form, I read the dissertation with much interest, but I am not aware that my own treatment was modified as a consequence. While I agree in the main with Dr. Spaulding's interpretation of Cumberland, and recognize in the dissertation a very thorough piece of work, my own treatment will be found quite different. I have given considerably more attention to other writers, in my attempt to show the relation of the De legibus naturae to preceding and contemporary thought, and have passed somewhat lightly over the parts of the work which seemed to be merely incidental, and not of importance for the further development of the principles involved. In particular, I have attempted, as far as possible, to separate the constructive part of the treatise from the controversial part, which has led me to exhibit the jural aspect of the system last, thus showing in how far the system is logically complete without it. Other differences will be obvious to any one who may take the trouble to compare these articles with Dr. Spaulding's dissertation.
