quite clear. On the whole, however, Grotius would seem to hold that certain things are right, others wrong, in the nature of things, i.e., apart from the will of God. Whether the nature of things be ultimately the same with the nature of God, we do not here need to ask. The question would hardly have occurred to Grotius.
It is probable that the ethical and political philosophy of Hobbes is not so closely connected with his mechanical philosophy as he himself would have had us believe. Certainly it is quite comprehensible by itself. Indeed, in the course of his expositions, Hobbes ordinarily refers to common experience rather than to his own first principles. The starting-point of his ethical speculation is probably to be found in the then current conception of Laws of Nature,[1] which we have just been considering. This will be assumed to be the case in what follows.
In order fully to understand Hobbes's view of the nature of man, we must distinguish (1) man's need of society; (2) his fitness for society; (3) his love of society, for its own sake. (1) That man has need of society,—in the sense of an organized commonwealth,—Hobbes would have been the first to insist. Out of society, indeed, man cannot continue to exist at all. But (2) man's fitness for society does not by any means keep pace with his need of the same. Children and fools need society, if possible, more than others, and yet they "cannot enter into it," in Hobbes's sense of the words. Indeed, many, perhaps most, men remain throughout life 'unfit' for society, either through defect of mind or want of education.[2] The main reason for this unfitness, however, is man's fundamental egoism. If it be asked: (3) Does man love society for its own sake? Hobbes replies with a decided negative. "All society ... is either for gain or for glory; that is, not so much for love of our fellows as for the love of ourselves."[3] So much is plain, but it is not equally plain in what terms we are to express this primitive egoism. Sometimes pleasure as such
