general survey of the system, based upon the Introduction, we shall neglect the author's own order of exposition, and consider topically all the important problems which are discussed in the treatise.
Cumberland begins by asserting that the Laws of Nature are the foundation of all moral and civil knowledge. They may be deduced in two ways: (1) From the manifest 'effects' that flow from them; (2) from the 'causes' whence they themselves arise. The author chooses to adopt the latter method, i.e., that of 'arguing from cause to effect.' The former is practically the inductive, the latter the deductive method. Two objections are commonly made to the inductive method, as applied to the solution of the present problem, (1) It is said that we cannot infer from the writings of a few men, or even nations, what are the opinions or judgments of all men. (2) Even if the above objection did not hold, 'the authority of a known law-giver' is wanting to give these judgments the force of 'laws' to all men.[1] To neither of these objections does Cumberland himself attach much weight. The agreement of men is practically complete as to the things most essential, e.g., worship of some deity, and a degree of humanity sufficient to prevent murder, theft, and adultery. Again, if the Laws of Nature be 'laws' at all, they need no new authority superadded to that originally belonging to them. However, to establish the existence of Natural Laws beyond the possibility of a doubt, Cumberland proposes to reverse the usual order of treatment. He says: "I have thought it proper to make a philosophical inquiry into their causes [i.e., those of the Laws of Nature], as well internal as external, the nearer and the more remote; for by this method we shall at last arrive at their first Author, or efficient Cause, from whose essential perfections, and internal sanction of them, by rewards and punishments, we have shown that their authority arises."[2]
It will be seen that the method to be employed can hardly be described by the single word 'deductive.' First, we must work back to the First Cause; then, from the nature of the
