The true significance of the word 'ought' is one of the problems of Ethics. Its use, however, is of course not confined to Ethics. We speak as readily of what the answer to a sum in arithmetic 'ought' to be, as of what we 'ought' to do in any given circumstances. In its last analysis, I think, it will be found that it is the formula of Deduction, as 'is' is the formula of Experience. When we say that the radii of any given circle are equal, or very nearly so, we are looking at the truth from the side of observation. When we say that they ought to be equal, we mean that if the circle were an ideal one, if the opening of the compasses used in constructing it has been kept precisely the same throughout, they assuredly will be equal.[1] This pursuit of the same through all varieties of position, direction, and environment, is the essence of Deduction, and this is also the essence of the reasoning that leads us to affirm one act to be right and another to be wrong. Justice means, as we know, nothing else but evenness. In as far as a man is just, he will look on any action as the same by whomsoever perpetrated. If it be one which, if committed by another against himself, would arouse a sentiment of anger and disgust, it will arouse a parallel sentiment when committed in idea by himself against some one else. There is in such a sentiment no thought of consequences, no suggestion that one should not do a thing for fear of some possible punishment. The feeling rather is: "Do it? No, the thing is hateful; it is what ought not to be done." And just as to a line that, from whatsoever position it starts, fails to take the shortest route between two points we affix the epithet 'crooked,' so to an act that ought not to be committed, from whomsoever emanating, we affix the epithet 'bad.'
William W. Carlile.
PROFESSOR ORMOND'S "BASAL CONCEPTS IN PHILOSOPHY."
In a former number of the Review,[2] I analyzed briefly this metaphysical treatise; and it was suggested that I might afterwards criticize some of the author's first principles. It is my purpose here to consider some aspects of his doctrines concerning being, non
- ↑ It seems to contain also an implication that, as a matter of fact, they are not found to be equal, otherwise we should use the word 'must.' It thus sets the ideal standard over against the realized result and contrasts the two. It is this aspect of its meaning, I think, that gives it its suitability for Ethical application.
- ↑ The Philosophical Review, July, 1894.
