former, we deny the basis of truth and morality, and man becomes as an animal. But most men find themselves compelled to recognize a supreme norm both of right and of truth. Man follows these naturally, and if he follow evil or untruth he becomes the slave of deceit. The deception of evil and untruth exists in our notions and in things, and this is the source of all crime. Life, according to the higher interests, is life according to true reality, while an evil life is one of deception. Man's law of thought is the concept of the absolute, and, with it, the notion of the good and the true; "it is at once the basis of logic and of science, and the ground principle of morality and religion."
J. R. Brown.
Libertarians have fought long for the formula, 'what is not yet accomplished is not yet accomplished'; determinists for the formula, 'what is already accomplished is already accomplished.' It remains to add the supreme formula, 'there are acts.' This means that the subjective world is enriched with new facts, which are their own authors. The sum of these is the ego, which is accordingly its own author, and entirely responsible for what it is, although it could not be other. Whatever is accomplished is right; the motive which was strongest was therefore best. Each new act the condition of progress is a crime viewed from the past, but becomes good by success, while all that is now good will become bad. This is a system of 'amoralism.' All moral systems attempt to constrain the absolute spontaneity of the act by rules, and hence will be overthrown. The present system merely states facts.
H. C. Howe.
Human teleological action is voluntary action. Many of the most valuable elements of human life are not due to man's purposive action, e.g., his power of perceiving truth, his social instincts, and his sympathy. These endowments of thought and instinct are part of the moral life. Ideo-motor actions are teleological and voluntary in one sense, yet we have not here the deliberate purpose of human intelligence. There are many kinds of actions: those which are the natural exercises of the faculties; those which are random; habitual
