spective of the question as to whose good it may be. The difference between these two parts which Reason plays is important. The second is apparently inconsistent with the general tendency of the system. Cumberland's view, that benevolent feeling first came into human life with sexual love and the parental instinct to protect the young, has been sufficiently noticed; as also his view that the kindly affections (regarded physiologically) tend toward the conservation of the individual, while the contrary is true of the malevolent affections. It should also be kept in mind that, when opposing the egoism of Hobbes, the author always attempts to prove, not simply that man is, to a certain degree, benevolent; but that he must be so, from the nature of the human organism and its relation to that greater organism, society, of which it is a constituent part. Cumberland's treatment of the benevolent feelings inevitably suggests the evolutionary view, but it is easy to see that it is consistent with his own static view of things. On the whole, we are left somewhat in doubt as to whether the motive of the moral agent is ever wholly altruistic. At the same time, as we have already seen, perhaps this is not one of the things which we should criticise in the system, as the question is a somewhat abstract one, which naturally did not trouble Cumberland, whose aim throughout was eminently practical. It was enough for him that we are practically altruistic in many of our actions, i.e., free from selfish calculations regarding a probable reward.
II. Turning to the Good, we were obliged to conclude that it is described, now in terms of 'preservation' or 'perfection,' now in terms of 'happiness.' As regards the first set of passages, Professor Sidgwick is probably wrong in holding that Cumberland does not define perfection so as strictly to exclude 'moral perfection,' which, of course, would involve him in a logical circle. From this point of view, the Good is that which preserves and perfects both mind and body. As regards the passages which seem to make 'happiness' the end, we were obliged to ask what was meant by 'happiness,' for the term is very vaguely used by early ethical writers. It was found to
