not decide in favor of a motive which is not present in consciousness at the time. (2) Motives may present themselves under two aspects: (a) when they are suggested purely by hearsay, memory, habit, etc.; (b) when they are apprehended in their full significance. The same motive may be stronger or weaker, according as it presents itself in the one way or the other. Hence the possibility of seeing the better and following the worse. (3) It is true that many of our actions are not preceded by an intelligent choice, but only by the 'moral sentiment' before spoken of. But the same holds good of aesthetic judgments, and may be explained by the psychological law according to which a mental act, often performed, tends to lose its clearness in consciousness.
E. A.
The conflict between Egoism and Altruism, between self-assertion and self-denial, still rages. Admitting the claims of Altruism, as the tendency of modern thought compels us to do, we yet cannot set aside the claims of self-realization. It would seem that the antithesis should be overcome by a synthesis. Professor James' distinction between 'I' and 'me,' between the self as subject and the self as object, may help us to a solution of the problem. Selfishness or Egoism is 'me-ishness,' or, better still, 'no-other-ishness,' i.e., a disposition to pay attention to things which are of special interest to self, with little regard to what concerns others. The 'I' as subjective self includes all that comes into consciousness, the 'me' as well as other things. Selfish actions relate to the 'me' rather than to the 'I.' Selfishness consists, not in having regard for the 'me,' but in regarding it to the neglect of other 'me's.' Selfishness is negative, self-denial positive. But positive self-denial is almost the same as self-assertion. It is self-assertion that is thoughtful of others as well as of self. Such a course of life demands an expansion of the 'I' in order to make room for all legitimate objects of interest and sympathy, and so the highest self-realization goes hand-in-hand with the truest Altruism. It is a question whether one may not sometimes be called upon to sacrifice not only the 'me' but the 'I' also. Take, for example, the case of the reformer who gives up the ideal broad development of his own character that he may devote all his energies to the promotion of a single worthy cause. A second 'I' may also be introduced, the ideal 'I' toward which we strive.
