mind or self may become,—what developments of its being are possible; and for this we must have an at least partly true conception of what it is. In other words: the question of there being an ultimate Ideal is an ontological one; it is, in fact, the question of the nature and purpose of the individual life.
If, as I have suggested, the facts of experience which lead us to adopt a teleological view will also show us in what way we may represent the End,—if the End will have to be formulated in terms of these facts,—then we cannot use it (our representation of the End) as a premiss from which to deduce detailed rules for passing ethical judgment on those facts. The Ideal will be 'regulative,' not in the sense that it shows us in detail what we ought to do, but in the sense of showing us that in every situation, in every walk of life, there is something to be done; and requiring us to find what it is (so far as we are able) and to do it. It is, I think, very satisfactory to observe the way in which a group of writers—some of whom may not object to be classed as 'Neo-Hegelians'—have laid stress upon this. Thus, Mr. J. H. Muirhead says: "It would be a mistake to confuse the task of the moral philosopher, which is to bring the human End or Standard of moral judgment to clear consciousness, with the task of the ethical writer, which is to make this clear consciousness prevail and turn it to practical account for the guidance of life" (Mind, No. 7, P- 397)- Similarly, Mr. J. S. Mackenzie says: "What seems to be needed is rather a critical study, ... defining for us the ideal by which we are to be inspired, but leaving the particular applications of it to the sensible good neighbor and citizen" (Mind, No. 10, p. 200). Professor John Dewey puts the matter as clearly as could be wished. Speaking of "the possibility of deciding whether this or that proposed act is right," he says: "We do not have to trace the connection of the act with some end beyond, such as pleasure, or abstract law. We have only to analyze the act itself. We have certain definite and wholly concrete facts: the given capacity of the person at the given moment, and his given surroundings. The judgment as to the
