'ethical writer' and 'practical reformer,' not only from the best insight of his own time, but by considering the expansion of the conception of Right which takes place with the maturing of social life in the course of history.[1] There can be no doubt that ideas of the concrete forms of duty have been modified in the course of time, according to the varying requirements of social life and conditions; and a study of this process of growth must be of value for understanding what forms of social conduct are appropriate to the present conditions. On this view the question is purely sociological, not biological; we start with individuals living in the presence of their fellows; individuals who have the capacity for sympathetic insight into the social consequences of their conduct,—the capacity for sympathy which is based on the ability to represent to one's self the life and feelings of another,—and who are capable of valuing such social consequences as one form of the standard. Within such a moral world we may have an intelligible evolution of ideas of Duty and Right.[2]
This study, however, would belong essentially to practical or applied Ethics. Valuable material for it exists in many sociological and ethical writings.
§ 3. I now proceed to indicate the facts which support the teleological view that there is an ultimate Ideal of human life, which justifies us in attaching an ethical value to all forms of human activity (whether outward conduct or inner movement of intellect and feeling).
We have seen that in addition to the function of our personality which appears in knowledge,—in judgments as to the
- ↑ The Idealistic treatment of Evolution as a continuous and universal process will be discussed at a later stage.
- ↑ The conception of Right and the Feeling of Obligation must be distinguished. We may revise and expand our conception of Right, but the Feeling does not change along with it. Doubtless the judgments 'this is right 'and 'this ought to be done,' considered merely as intellectual facts, mean the same thing; but the former, strictly speaking, implies nothing beyond reference to a standard; while the latter is the expression of the Feeling which prompts that reference. I think we may say that Feeling prompts the quest for a standard—just as it prompts and initiates every kind of psychical activity—but is not itself that standard.
