Page:Philosophical Review Volume 4.djvu/78

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62
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. IV.

Another consideration confirms our conclusion. If a process in time is the most fundamental fact in the universe, the very idea of a Final Cause or world-aim would have to be rejected as a figment of the imagination. To speak of a Final Cause implies that the ultimate and most reasonable explanation of existence must be sought, not in a 'First Cause' or state out of which things emerge, but in a goal towards which they move,—a τέλος or End regarded as the explanatory cause of the whole development. Hence, on the one side, unless the movement—the process of change—is real, there is nothing to explain, and it would be meaningless to speak of a Final Cause; on the other side, unless the τέλος in all its fullness is an abiding reality through the process, it is no explanation; it would have to be thought of as another process added on to the former.

(d) It will be seen that we have come upon the problem, In what sense is Time a reality? It must be observed that by Time is not meant abstract or 'empty' Time,—Time unfilled by any kind of events,—Time without any kind of content. This is an abstraction which it is perfectly useless to talk about, even if it were intelligible, which is doubtful. Time is only experienced by us in the form of a succession of changing events, and for our experience it can mean nothing else; I therefore regard it as accepted that the conception of Time is indistinguishable from that of Change or Becoming (these terms being used as synonymous),—that Time as conceived is simply the general schema or form of Change.[1]

  1. We can distinguish degrees of definiteness or generality in the conception of Change. Thus, Change may mean: (a) Qualities (of any kind) following one another in succession (of any kind). This we may call 'Change-in-general.' (b) Qualities in succession, viewed as 'continuous,' i.e., as belonging together, in some kind of unity. (c) Qualities in succession, viewed as held together in a unity of such a kind that they can change only within a closed series of forms; in other words, according to a determinate law. This is 'determinate change,'—the Change or Becoming of an individual thing.

    When we attempt to make the conception of Time clear and distinct, it coincides either with (a) or with (b).