to x), 'expression.' Aristotle uses the term μίμησις to indicate the latter relation as well as the former. We must therefore suppose that for him μίμησις had a wider meaning than ordinarily attaches to the word.—From Plato's standpoint, the artist must be regarded as copying the appearance only, precisely as the photographic camera reproduces an object. On Aristotle's view, however, we may say there is first the concrete object, then the εἶδος in the mind of the artist, then its expression by him. We may even dismiss as unneces- sary the given concrete reality, and start with the εἶδος in the mind of the artist. Aristotle's real view, in short, is that fine art is the expression of the universal, and plainly for a true theory of art expression is the essential operation, not imitation in the ordinary meaning of the term.—The origin of poetry is referred by Aristotle to two 'psychological conditions' (αἰτίαι φυσικαί). These are not the tendency to imitation and the tendency to delight in imitation, as is commonly supposed; nor are they the tendency to imitate and rejoice in imitations, and the tendency towards knowledge, as Bosanquet thinks. In each of these cases the two conditions are not independent. The truth seems to be that the instinct for imitation and the instinct for harmony and rhythm are the conditions referred to by Aristotle. On this view, poetry would be regarded as having gradually developed out of instinctive mimicry, which had throughout for its aim the expression of order and beauty.—Although in preceding divisions Aristotle has clearly distinguished tragedy from epic, at the end of the fifth chapter a fresh differentiation is given, the ground of division being the length (μῆκος) of the dramatic μίμησις. This passage is important, partly because it is the first explicit appearance of a consideration of value, and partly because it is used in the definition of tragedy. David Irons
Gedächtniss-theoretische Untersuchungen. Bergemann. Ar. f. G. d. Ph., VIII, iii, pp. 336-353.
Plato distinguishes between ἀνάμνησις and μνήμη. The former is recollection through association by similarity or contiguity (Phaedo 73 B if.). It is an active voluntary process of reproducing what was once in the mind. On the other hand μνήμη is memory or the passive continuance of a sense-impression. It is psychophysical (Philebus 34 B). Ἀνάμνησις without any cooperation of the body revives what was once in the mind. It is the revival of a fragment of knowledge which the soul had in a preexistent state (Phaedo 76 C).
