as we have seen, are explained by the 'association of ideas' and what has more recently been termed the 'law of obliviscence.' We begin as egoists, and, indeed, throughout our lives we uniformly seek our own pleasures, avoid our own pains. But it amounts to much the same thing as if we were originally altruistic to a certain degree. For, although our own happiness be always our 'ultimate' end, it is by no means always our 'proximate' end. The system theoretically allows for cases of extreme self-sacrifice. Whether it really affords a satisfactory explanation of these, is a question which we hardly need enter upon here. The present generation is not likely to make, or allow, extraordinary claims for the unaided principle of 'association.'
So much for the treatment of the 'criterion' of moral action and of the motive of the moral agent by the two authors whom we are comparing. Closely related to the latter question is that of the ultimate meaning of 'obligation.' It will be remembered that Cumberland's treatment of obligation was not altogether consistent with his system as a whole. Instead of basing upon the essentially social nature of man and claiming here, as generally elsewhere, a certain amount of altruism for the moral agent, he merely tries to show that it is greatly for the selfish advantage of any given individual to lead the moral life, even when extreme sacrifices are demanded. This was doubtless done in order to meet Hobbes on his own ground, but the same reason led Cumberland to confine his arguments to consequences that might be expected in this present life. For obvious reasons, he does not make out a perfectly clear case.
Gay was not hampered with any such controversial considerations. His treatment is only too clear and consistent throughout. "Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting any action in order to be happy.… And no greater obligation can be supposed to be laid upon any free agent without an express contradiction." This was as consistent for Gay as it was otherwise for Cumberland; and he immediately goes on to enumerate "the four different manners in which [obligation] is induced." These are precisely what appear later as Bentham's four "sanc-
