needs to be reminded that Gay's remarkable essay is entirely free from such superfluities. One point, however, should be noticed in this connection. Gay refers, of course, to the Will of God as the 'immediate criterion' of morality; but the Divine Will itself is determined to that which will bring the greatest happiness to mankind, or, as the author himself expresses it, "The happiness of mankind is the criterion of the Will of God." The Utilitarian principle, then, is clearly regarded as ultimate. It would be a gross misunderstanding of Gay to class him with those who make morality depend upon the arbitrary will of God.
It will be noticed that neither Cumberland nor Gay discusses the possibility of the 'hedonistic calculus.' Neither of them seems to suspect any difficulty in the matter, and, so far as I am aware, this had never been distinctly raised as an objection to hedonism up to the time which we are considering. Perhaps this was to be expected, for such refinements are likely to belong to a later stage of ethical discussion; but it does at first seem rather strange that, while Gay was the earliest consistent exponent of the Utilitarian principle, he did not anywhere use the formula, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' Hutcheson, it will be remembered, had used this very formula, though it does not for him express the whole essence of morality, as it would have done for Gay; and Gay must have been familiar with Hutcheson's writings, for he controverts them intelligently.
It would be quite too ingenious to suggest that Gay refrained from using the expression precisely because Hutcheson had happened to use it. He seems to have been quite willing to avail himself of all that he considered true in the Inquiry. The only importance which really can be attached to the omission is this: Gay and his immediate successors[1] held clearly and definitely to the view that, in the last resort, all human motives are selfish. From this standpoint, the (now accepted) formula
- ↑ With the exception of Hume, whose treatment of 'sympathy' is ambiguous in Book III of the Treatise, and who admits a certain degree of native altruism in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.
