necessary, in order to determine more precisely the place of ethics among the sciences, to distinguish carefully between two types or groups of sciences, both alike distinguishable from metaphysics or philosophy. The common task of all science is the rationalization of our judgments, through their organization into a system of thought; when thus systematized, our judgments are scientifically 'explained.' But these judgments are of two kinds: judgments of fact and judgments of worth, or judgments of what is and judgments of what ought to be. There are, accordingly, two types of science: (1) the type which seeks to organize into a rational system the chaotic mass of our Is-judgments; (2) the type which seeks to organize into a rational system the no less chaotic mass of our Ought-judgments. The former type of science we may call natural or descriptive; the latter, normative or appreciative. The purpose of the natural or descriptive sciences is the discovery, by reason, of the actual or phenomenal order—the order that characterizes 'matters of fact'; the purpose of the normative or appreciative sciences is the discovery, by the same reason, of the ideal order which always transcends and rebukes the actual order. The natural sciences seek to penetrate to the universal law or the principle of order, in terms of which we can alone consistently and completely describe the facts of the universe; the normative sciences seek the universal standard, in terms of which we can alone consistently appreciate the facts of the universe—their common measure of value. The natural sciences have to do with processes, with events, with modis operandi; the normative sciences have to do with products and their quality. The function of the one set of sciences is measurement, that of the other is evaluation. The one finds rational order in the facts of the world and human life; the other judges the facts of the world and life by reference to a rational order which always transcends the facts themselves. The result of the common effort of the one group is what Professor Royce has called the 'world of description'; that of the other, the 'world of appreciation.' [1]
- ↑ The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, lect. xii.
