the 'moral sense' writers, and it is fair to assume that he was historically, as well as logically, related to them in this respect.
Although Hume's writings are so much better known at first hand than those of Cumberland and Gay,—the only two of his English predecessors who can really be said to have stated the Utilitarian principle,—it is more difficult than might be supposed to present his views on Ethics in a way to leave no room for misunderstanding. In the first place, one has to keep in mind Hume's relation to the 'moral sense' school, and avoid attributing either too much or too little importance to this relation; and, in the second place,—what is much more important,—one has to decide, after the most careful examination and comparison, whether one shall accept his earlier or his later treatment of Ethics as the more adequately representing his system.
As regards Hume's relation to the 'moral sense' philosophers, little need be said at present. It is worth noticing, however, that the apparently complex character of his ethical system has led some to believe that its general drift is somewhat ambiguous, and that to the end it holds a rather close relation to the 'moral sense' ethics.[1] This view is, in my opinion, by no means correct; but, as the mistake is a natural one, a comparison may prove helpful. In the case of Hutcheson, we found a moralist whose doctrine could hardly be understood without comparing it carefully with the 'greatest happiness' principle. At the same time, we found that, in its general tendency, it was radically distinct from that principle. Exactly the opposite, it seems to me, is true in the case of Hume. While he certainly was influenced by the 'moral sense' writers, 'utility' is with him by no means a subsidiary principle, as with Hutcheson, but incontestably the basis of his whole ethical system. This is a dogmatic statement; but its truth will, I think, become abundantly plain as we proceed with our examination of Hume's treatment of Ethics.
- ↑ See, e.g., Professor Hyslop's Elements of Ethics, p. 84; also, for a much more guarded statement, referring only to the later form of Hume's ethical theory, see Mr. Selby-Bigge's Introduction to his edition of Hume's Enquiries, p. xxvi.
