tinctly recognize, the question how, given altruistic as well as egoistic tendencies, the developed virtue of benevolence (as distinguished from mere impulsive kindliness) was to be explained.
Beginning, as he nearly always does, with our actual approval of moral actions, Hume remarks that the very words we use to describe "the benevolent or softer affections" indicate the universal attitude toward them. He says: "The epithets sociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and universally express the highest merit which human nature is capable of attaining."[1] But Hume further points out that, when we praise the benevolent man, there is one circumstance which we always insist upon, i.e., the happiness of others which inevitably results from his habitual mode of action. Indeed, as we have had occasion to note in another connection, Hume seems never to have given up the view, definitely expressed in the Treatise (à propos of the distinction between the 'natural' and the 'artificial' virtues), that the good which results from benevolence "arises from every single act."[2] Now since benevolence does have this universal tendency to make for happiness, it seems fair to assume that utility forms at least a part of the merit of benevolent actions. But the further we examine into the matter, the more utility is found to be an adequate explanation of our approbation of such actions, while other modes of explanation in a corresponding degree lose their plausibility. The practically inevitable presumption, then, is that utility is the sole ground of our approbation of benevolent actions. It remains to be seen, of course, whether it will prove sufficient to explain the other great social virtue, justice, as well as a number of self-regarding virtues which will be mentioned later.
Before leaving this present subject of benevolence, however, it will be well to see how Hume's treatment of the virtue accords with his mature view regarding the springs of human action. It has been said that benevolent actions please on ac-
