modern logical problems with a mastery of Aristotle's scattered and partly incoherent utterances. Dr. Maier meets these essential demands in an eminent degree, and we have reason to anticipate from this work so ably begun something like an authoritative statement and criticism of Aristotle's logical theory.
It is manifestly impossible, in so brief a notice, to single out particulars for criticism. I shall therefore content myself with a general objection which may help to characterize the author's method. Hitherto the prevailing error in the interpretation of Aristotle's logic has been that of seeking to deduce the logic from his metaphysics. The utter impossibility of doing so without a flagrant disregard of Aristotle's own statements and the fair inferences from his argumentation, Dr. Maier has abundantly demonstrated. He thus sums up in part the results of his first volume: "The logical types of the judgment are arrived at by a logical empiricism which proceeded from the data of language and sought to discover in its forms their logical content. These types at the same time represent real relations: herein resides their truth and logical validity. Nevertheless they are not based upon metaphysical principles. The judgment of possibility alone is distinctly referred to metaphysical potentiality ; but even this connection has no ulterior significance for logical theory. Consequently, the logico-ontological differences between forms of the judgment do not coincide with metaphysical differences" (pp. 212 ff.). We thus see that the author has been chiefly interested in defining the relations between the logic and the metaphysics of Aristotle; the relations which might possibly be found to exist between the logic and his psychology receive absolutely no attention. And yet all would admit, I fancy, that the psychological presuppositions of the philosopher, which are largely the expression of his historical position, must have exercised on his thought a more potent because intangible influence than any formal pronouncement on ultimate reality. Besides, the very point Dr. Maier endeavors to establish could be satisfactorily disposed of, if he showed, what may be readily done, that Aristotle's views on logic were fully matured before he arrived at the most distinctive features of his metaphysics. Dr. Maier's discussion and criticism move upon a purely logical plane, as complacently as if the current efforts to attain a psychological logic were wholly unknown to him. Yet, in spite of this fact, the author's clear statement and unfailing judgment have produced a work deserving of high praise, a work the remaining volumes of which we look forward to with impatience.
W. A. Heidel.
Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London,
William Blackwood & Sons, 1897.—pp. cxxvi, 233.The purpose of this volume is thus described by the author, whose admirable little work, John Stuart Mill: A Study of his Philosophy was noticed
