gains from a sense of virtue and from a consciousness of having acted rightly and according to the rule of virtue.[1] It is practically synonymous with the satisfaction afforded by the approval of conscience. Does this mean that every other pleasure is tabooed; that no gratification save that of a good conscience is permissible? Not at all! More was not more than half ascetic. The method by which he manages to restrict happiness to a sense of virtue, and yet to give a place to all the other legitimate pleasures, shows great ingenuity. One must notice that this saint-like happiness is an exacting entity. It requires the entire attention of the mind. Clearly, then, no one can enjoy it if his mind is distracted by grief or apprehension.[2] Disease or hard servitude would be likely to kill it altogether. Even poverty is a disturbing factor. A moderate amount of wealth enables a man to do what he ought.[3] All these agreeable accessories are called external goods;[4] that is, they are not necessary for perfection, though they may adorn it, and may be necessary for happiness. Some are absolutely required for the latter, such as those mentioned above. Some, while not necessities, are confessedly of great value.
We have now considered the two best parts of life. Which is the better? It is characteristic of More that he does not consider the possibility of making happiness alone the summum bonum. The supposition that virtue constitutes it is considered, but rejected.[5] An unhappy life cannot be a perfect one. Perfection is found in a union of virtue and happiness. Neither is enough in itself; the two are indissolubly united. To separate them is almost an abstraction. Closely as virtue and happiness are connected in their ultimate nature, they are no less so in the manner of their perception. The same divine intuition sees the good, and delights in it.[6] The action is not double, but one. When we speak of virtue and happiness, we are talking of the same thing viewed under different aspects.
