gested, however, that these two theories of obligation, the one deriving it from the concept of an end, the other from the consciousness of obligation which is implied in the act of approbation or disapprobation, can be reconciled if we remember Butler's argument from design. In one sense, the only obligation is that which the end imposes. Now the end for Butler is virtue; but this end was derived from an examination of human nature, in which was discovered a principle evidently designed for another purpose than those principles of action which man has in common with brutes. Hence it seems legitimate for Butler to argue either from an end derived in such a manner to the fact of obligation, or from that principle in human nature, the existence of which gave us virtue as an end, to the obligation to pursue that end. It is really one and the same argument. However, this problem is involved in the doctrine of conscience, and a full treatment of it would necessitate a detailed discussion of Butler's account of the moral faculty.
Proceeding with the analysis of man's nature, Butler finds two other general principles, in addition to the many particular affections which terminate in particular objects as their end. These two are self-love and benevolence, the former of which has regard for private good, the latter for the good of the community. Here again Butler uses the argument from design. That these two principles do exist is an undeniable fact of analysis. What then is their significance, their purpose, in a nature like ours? Evidently that as we have in us principles which make both for our own and others' good, then, if we are to follow nature, both of these must have some place in the true end of man, and reason must assign to each its due and just proportion. "There are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow creatures; as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good,"[1] for "there is a natural principle of benevolence in man; which is in some degree to society, what self-love is to the individual,"[2] and the only meaning these can have is that we have a social, as well as an individual, end. Although these
