Page:Philosophical Review Volume 8.djvu/154

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138
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. VIII.

being, the principle of reflection or conscience, which too as plainly regards the interest of public as of private good.[1]

Such in brief is Butler's argument that man has a social as well as an individual end. Against this sort of argument Butler foresees that the obvious objection may be raised: "Has not man dispositions and principles within, which lead him to do evil to others as well as good?" He retorts by asking, "Has not man also dispositions and principles within, which lead him to do evil to himself, as well as good? … It may be thought easier to answer one of these questions than the other, but the answer to both is really the same."[2] This rejoinder is sufficient to show that, if we make use of principles within us that lead us to do evil to our fellows to prove that we are not made to do good to society, then we must also argue from the existence in our nature of self-destroying principles, that we are not adapted to individual good and self-preservation. But this demonstrates simply that evil to others and evil to self are both to be explained in the same way; it merely states the whole problem rather than one-half of it, and does not solve the difficulty, which is undoubtedly a real one. Butler, however, proceeds immediately to give the clue to his final answer—an answer too which is to be found throughout the Sermons and the Analogy and one which is easily deducible from his general position. It is simply a denial that there are any inward principles which lead man to do evil in the same sense that there are principles which lead him to do good.[3] As there is no general rational principle of self-hatred, so neither is there any general rational principle of malevolence toward our fellows. Further, particular affections never make for evil for its own sake: "there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, but only such and such desires after such and such external goods."[4]

If there are no inner principles which naturally prompt men to evil, how are vicious actions to be accounted for? Evidently such

  1. Loc. cit.
  2. Ibid., Sect. II, pp. 45-46.
  3. Sermons, II, Sect. 4, pp. 53-54.
  4. Sermons, I, Sect. II, p. 46; cf. also Analogy, I, iii, Sect. 19, pp. 77-78.