arise, is individual and cannot yield universal laws of duty. The latter, the perfectionists, are in error in supposing that the good, or perfection, is something desired for its own sake, the truth being that all objects are desired, not for themselves, but for the satisfaction following their attainment. Hence Kant finds himself in opposition at once to the transcendental and to the immanent schools of moralists. The old methods must be abandoned. To be a moralist one must be an innovator.
Characteristic of the new view of Kant is the distinction of the form and the matter of an act, and the principle that the form alone, without consideration of the matter, i.e., the result, determines its morality, whence he deduces the freedom, the autonomy, of the moral will and the categorical imperative: "Act so that the maxim of thy will shall always be valid as a principle of universal legislation." Or, "Act so that thou treat humanity, whether in thine own person, or in that of another, always as an end, and never as a means."
This principle, then, that the form alone, apart from all question of results, determines moral quality, is the guiding principle in the theory.
M. Cresson devotes about one-third of his book to the exposition of Kant's moral system as set forth in his several ethical treatises. One who desires to acquaint himself with that system will find in the first two chapters of the volume an excellent introduction. The third chapter contains the writer's critical estimate of Kant's ethical theory. There are two questions to be answered: 1. Is the system consistently developed from its principles? 2. Are the principles sound?
The first question is this: Admitting the fundamental principles, do the Theory of Right and the Theory of Virtue follow logically from the Metaphysics of Morality and the Critique of Practical Reason? Criticism will make it appear that Kant has not escaped the serious error of being illogical. First, however, he must be justified against the accusations of Schopenhauer, who charges Kant with entire oblivion of his principles when drawing his conclusions. Kant has declared moral worth to consist solely in obedience to the moral law, because it is the law, without further considerations. But when the question arises what is to determine whether an act may or may not have the authority of a universal law, it is answered: Consider whether it would cause pleasure or pain to one so acting, if everybody should do the same. Regard for consequences to one's self of an act, if universally practised, determine its morality. But this
