tions' repudiates this dualism. He does not however provide us with the required rationale, but only resolves one term of this dualism into its other, or rather into a mere fragment of that other. He finds the unity, the required rationale, in the imitation instinct. Now by imitation is ordinarily meant a mental process in which the excited reaction is similar to the exciting perception. If, therefore, we simply trace imitation throughout the social structure, we must clearly conclude by ignoring all differences. Professor Baldwin is sensible of this defect, and is therefore forced to strain his definition of imitation so as to include "every reaction by which in consequence of a certain stimulus an organism secures to itself more of the same stimulus." But, so defined, imitation loses all its differentia and is therefore no longer imitation. The defect in this argument most surely lies in the premises. This defect is twofold, (1) Invention is limited to the individual, which is not the case. All social conduct involves "joint invention." A house is such a "joint invention." It is an universal in which many minds have met. (2) The imitating mind does not work with similarity, but with identity. So long as we use the notion of similarity we are compelled to ignore all differences, but directly we introduce the notion of identity these differences fall into line as an inherent aspect of this identity, and society becomes an organic unity, which was required to be shown.
Ira Mackay.
These articles are a continuation of the author's dissertation for the doctorate (Berlin, 1897) which was mainly concerned with an investigation of Kant's ethical views during the fifties. The whole forms a work which last year was crowned by the university of Berlin. In the articles before us, the author traces the influence of the English moral philosophers, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, upon the development of Kant's ethical ideas, and also the new direction which was given to his thought by the study of Rousseau. In general it may be said that Kant adopted the psychological method of the English writers, without accepting their results as an adequate solution of the moral problem. From Rousseau he derived the conception of the dignity and value of human nature as such, and an appreciation of the tremendous practical importance of moral philosophy. From both sources he learned the distinction between knowledge and feeling, and was thus led to recognize the important place of the latter in the moral life. The author next proceeds to analyze in detail Kant's precritical writings. He finds that even in the early sixties the fact of obligation was regarded by Kant as the fundamental ethical problem, though at that time he was unable to give any satisfactory solution of it. Indeed we may say that Kant's ethical investigations during the sixties led him to conclusions
