or to other phenomena, e.g., bodily effects. This seems, instead of being an analysis, to be entirely opposed to the precise analytic procedure of modern psychology. And it does not seem that this vagueness and generality in giving the data of the problem has any advantage, or that it does more than lead the author to discuss at length questions which belong rather to the philosophical or metaphysical treatment of mind and life, and which are best treated after the strictly scientific and positive work of investigation is ended.
W. G. Smith.
Smith College.
This is not a direct contribution either to ethics or to politics, separately considered, but an historical and critical sketch of the various theories of the relation of the individual to society, which prevailed from the time of Hobbes to the close of Locke's literary activity, and which, of course, exerted a most important influence upon both moral and political philosophy. Even so, the purpose seems to be, not so much to treat in detail the views of individual writers as to trace the rise and decadence of general tendencies of thought. A note states that "Miss Thompson is directly responsible for the section on Cumberland, and Mr. Tufts for the remainder of the essay."
The first part of the essay treats of general political and social conditions. Here it was inevitable that the writers should depend mainly upon secondary sources. This material, however, is used to good advantage, and the treatment is clear and interesting. The interpretation of Hobbes, which immediately follows, is rather open to criticism. The great significance of Hobbes is attributed, not to his maintenance of absolutism, nor to his peculiarly unflattering view of human nature. The writer says: "The significance lies rather in the fact that the upholder of absolutism founds all authority on the free consent of individuals, that the friend of monarchy asserts the prior existence and indispensable agency of democracy" (p. 17). [The italics are in the original.] It is doubtless quite true that one should not class a philosopher according to the real or supposed results of his method, but rather according to his method itself. At the same time, Hobbes's view of human nature and his method are inseparable; and it is hardly to be regarded as, even logically, a concession to democracy when he speaks, in a well-known passage (quoted in this connection), as if democracy necessarily preceded aristocracy and monarchy in the order of time, for he doubtless regarded democracy as only a provisional escape from political chaos. And surely the writer cannot mean what he seems to say, in reference to a passage quoted from Behemoth, in which Hobbes
