general argument, which seems beyond question to be intended to establish a view of morality as an independent and intrinsically worthy end in itself. How then is the passage under consideration to be reconciled with his general purpose and standpoint? As has been seen, Butler, in this sermon, is arguing against the theory that life is nothing but one continuous self-seeking that excludes the happiness of others. At the same time, consistent with his view of human nature as an organic whole, he has no intention of making morality purely rational, exclusive of the end of sentiency. He is anxious that "there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite passion" of self-love, "which hath so much allowed to it, and whose cause is so universally pleaded." "It shall be treated," he remarks with a touch of irony, "with the utmost tenderness and concern for its interests."[1] In doing this, as Mr. Leslie Stephen observes, "he is endangering the very core of his teaching." But the same critic immediately admits that "this view, however, might be exercised with benefit to the general argument."[2] The context indicates that the statement means simply that individual happiness must be the inevitable accompaniment of virtuous conduct, that in the common consciousness of mankind happiness and virtue must be organically united, and that no theory of morals which divorces the two can meet with general acceptance. That the two go hand in hand is a postulate implied in the moral order of the universe, and the common run of mankind would repudiate a system of morality which denied ultimate happiness to be the concomitant of virtue,[3] because such a denial would involve a destruction of the "good and perfect administration of things." If there is a moral government of the world, virtue cannot be finally crowned with misery.
As far as self-love and benevolence are concerned, the confusion on Butler's part seems to me to be due to the fact that he does not recognize that the disinterested side of conduct is not saved by pointing to the existence of other-regarding particular affec-
