Page:Philosophical Review Volume 9.djvu/413

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397
CONSCIENCE AND OBLIGATION.
[Vol. IX.

That we do possess such a perception and consequent approval of virtue, Butler thinks is a plain fact, established by the common consciousness of mankind, and by all experience. Both in the Sermons and the Dissertation Butler takes the position that the existence of conscience needs no proof, but is a simple fact of psychological analysis, the truth of which is sufficiently confirmed by a bare recital of any ordinary case of our moral experience.[1]

Let us turn now to his argument for the authority of conscience. "Conscience or reflection, compared with the other principles of action as they all stand together in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification: a disapprobation of reflection being in itself a principle manifestly superior to a mere propension."[2] It is thus superior in kind, and therefore speaks authoritatively, and there can be no question of comparative strength between it and other principles of action. Consequently, "the very constitution of our nature requires that we bring our whole conduct before this superior faculty; enforce upon ourselves its authority, and make it the business of our lives, as it is absolutely the whole business of a moral agent, to conform ourselves to it."[3] Authority and obligation are, therefore, a constituent part of the notion of conscience, involved "in the very idea of reflex approbation."[4] Hence the bare fact of the approval of conscience is in itself an obligation: "Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide."[5] The obligation still subsists even for a man who is not convinced that his interest will be served thereby, for "the greatest degree of scepticism will still leave men under the strictest moral obligations, whatever their opinion be concerning the happiness of virtue."[6] "Man, therefore, unlike brutes, is not left by his Maker to act at random,

  1. Diss. on Virtue, Sects. 1-2, pp. 398-399; Sermons, I, Sect. 8, pp. 42-43.
  2. Pref. to Sermons, Sect. 1 8, p. 13.
  3. Ibid., Sect. 19, p. 14.
  4. Ibid., Sect. 22, p. 16; Sermons, II, Sect. 19, p. 64.
  5. Sermons, III, Sect. 6, p. 71.
  6. Pref. to Sermons, Sects. 20-22, pp. 15-16.