tion into the abstract reasonableness of moral distinctions Butler himself never makes, because he is expounding a science, rather than a metaphysic, of morality.
It might be objected that, after the last word has been said, it is no real explanation to say that morality is constituted by that which is suitable to human nature, and that finally its truth is grounded in the 'eternal fitness of things'; that such an explanation is merely the employment of other words. This is, in a sense, true enough, but further reduction is impossible. An attempt to resolve morality into something more ultimate than itself would destroy Butler's entire theory. For him, morality, like truth, is an ultimate fact, and contains within itself its own 'why.' Virtue, like truth itself, admits of no definition in the strict sense of a final explanation, but can only be described and its content systematized. We cannot give any other 'why' for following the law of our nature than to say that it is reasonable. If, with the Hedonists, we say that happiness is the end of life, we cannot offer any abstract reason why we should strive for its attainment. For Butler, however, happiness was not the ultimate term of value, because he thought it could be resolved into something more comprehensive, namely, virtue, which is the supreme end in itself, the complete and ultimate good. Happiness is the concomitant, and, in a sense, the confirmation and reward of the virtuous life, because such a life is the performance of man's proper, peculiar, and natural function, while the establishment of a wise and just equilibrium between self-love and benevolence under the direction of the supreme guide of human action, is the fulfilling of the law of virtue and the attainment of happiness.
| Albert Lefevre. |
| Cornell University. |
