Fichte, says M. Bertrand, sums up all morality in the formula: "being free, and remaining free"—for the first part states the psychological, and the second the moral consciousness, besides expressing very exactly the passage from science to morality. Common to both is the principle of non-contradiction, which alone can assume the perfect coherence of action and unity of thought and will with the logical accord of thought. To be sure, this very principle of non-contradiction must be taken on faith—the faith with which the moralist accepts those truths that sciences foreign to his own furnish him as working material. There follows the outline of a four-years course in sociology and morals—tentative, of course, and filled with historical and critical comments. The first year M. Bertrand would give to psychology; the second to logic (with especial regard to logical errors and fallacies); the third to æsthetics; and the fourth to political economy, institutional history, and social morality in a word, as he says, to sociology.
Georgia Benedict.
In this article the writer has particular reference to his work entitled Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. The social unity, like any other unity, may be understood either as preceding the parts, which unity is called Gemeinschaft, or as constructed by thought out of a previous multiplicity, in which case it is called Geselhchaft. In the former case the unity finds expression primarily in affection, in the latter case in economic relations, in which individuals, more or less antagonistic to each other, nevertheless coöperate. In the theory put forth by the writer in the above mentioned book, it is attempted to maintain the individualistic conception within and in dependence upon the organic conception. The organic theory expresses the original and all-inclusive nature of social relations, provided that this theory be understood psychologically. The current theories follow too closely the analogy of biology and so do not adequately represent the facts. On the other hand, the scientific value of the theories which take their point of departure from the 'state of nature,' is that they oppose themselves to all supernatural explanations, and find the ratio essendi of the social structure in man's thinking and willing. Their defect is that they take a certain form of will, the will that distinguishes sharply between means and end, as the sole type of the human will, and so regard social relations simply as means to individual ends. There are, however, two forms of will. In the one case the will does not clearly distinguish between means and end; the end simply marks the stage of completion, while the means mark the stage of development regarding that which is willed; end and means are both willed spontaneously and include each other. This relation between means and end, which is best exemplified in artistic activity,
