tanism, they are held to spring in the first place from the predominance within the mind of some single thought in consequence of which it refuses to admit any opposing idea. The fanatic is the victim of a strong imagination. He is a visionary who strives to realize his dream against all opposition. If the opposition is so strong that our visionary gives up any hope of realizing his ideal, save in himself, perhaps, he degenerates into the charlatan. "The charlatan is the powerless fanatic," declares our author. This peculiar state of mind has many developments. As one man when he cannot act often takes refuge in high-sounding words, so another, whom circumstances keep from words even, delights in unfettered thoughts. In these men we often discover a curious scepticism, a disregard of results, an irresponsibility which amounts to mania, and which would seem, indeed, to be the normal result of this abnormal condition. Hence, concludes M. Dugas, "no wrong is done to thought by preventing its departure from the domain of action. It is only confined to its proper aim, held to its own nature, and to the office demanded by its own dignity."
Georgia Benedict.
The various predicates of moral judgments are ultimately based on either the emotions of indignation or approval. These are very like resentment and gratitude, differing only in the fact that the moral emotions are disinterested and relatively impartial. In modern ethics the 'ought' is generally taken as ultimate and unanalyzable. But it appears to be decomposable into conation and imperative. What 'ought not to be' calls forth moral indignation. The ideas of 'ought' and 'duty' thus spring from one source, viz.: the emotion of moral indignation. Right, however, is not identical with what is obligatory, but includes also the super-obligatory. Thus it derives its import from the notion of oughtness, and carries with it a duty. But rights and duties are not identical, for it is not always a man's duty to exercise a right. With the notion of right is connected that of justice, and justice is the discharge of a duty corresponding to a right. The essence of justice lies in impartiality within a recognized order of rights. Justice, then, which is a kind of rightness, obviously has its origin in moral indignation. There are also predicates involving moral approval, chief among which is 'goodness.' This is not identical with right, but represents a different point of view. Virtue denotes a disposition of mind which is characterized by some special kind of goodness. Virtue is goodness tried and tested, and is to be distinguished from duty and from merit. Merit expresses a tendency to give rise to the emotion of moral approval. Merit also refers to something more than duty, or to that which is somewhat unusual. In the morally indifferent, and in the super-obligatory, we find the ultra obligatory. 'Indifference' is often taken to refer to the means used to reach an end which is not itself indifferent. This cannot be
