nomic into the ethical motive "when economy broadens out into a provision for the expansion and the future development of life" (pp. 20-21). If "the moral motive is one that makes for largeness of conscious life" (p. 17), and if a man may act "for largeness of conscious life," then surely he is giving preferential attention to the moral motive; and yet, in accordance with the definition given, the moral motive in such a case must be the desires which are forced out of consciousness, and which will presently reassert themselves; for instance, perhaps, the desire for sensual enjoyment at present neglected in deference to larger interests now consulted. Professor Giddings's definition would necessitate the conclusion that no man could consciously act from what at the time would be the ethical motive. Strangely enough, the inclusion of future interests in the ethical motive leads to the exclusion of present attention to these future interests. The ethical motive, even upon Professor Giddings's own showing, can be no less than regard for the whole interest of the agent, including his future life with all its possibilities of improvement, but not excluding the present desires that clamorously assert themselves. There are other points of interest in this discussion of the ethical motive, for example, the proposed reconciliation of utilitarian ethics with the ethics of duty; but the limits of this review forbid further comment. The typography of the book is unusually good, only one error having come to the reviewer's notice. On page 264, line 4 from bottom, 'its' should read 'their.' The book is one to be strongly commended both for the sanity of its thought and the clearness of its expression.
Evander Bradley McGilvary.
Cornell University.
This volume is composed of the Gifford Lectures for 1898, and is the second series by the same author, the previous series on the Providential Order having been already published. The lectures before us are mainly historical and critical, dealing with what the leading moralists of the past have thought about the moral order of the world, and with the author's estimate of the value of their teachings. "We see," says Mr. Bruce, "that the sages of various lands, in far-past ages, unite in the emphatic assertion of a Moral Order as the thing of supreme moment for the faith and life of man." "The root of this basal faith is an intense moral consciousness. Men believe in a
