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fact that all new truth necessarily starts in a minority of one, should moderate our reliance on numbers as a test of truth. ‘Universal consensus’ is a consequence and not a cause of truth.

(4) It is in vain, therefore, that Plato attempts (in 170 E—171 C) to show that on his own principles Protagoras must bow to the verdict of the majority who reject his dictum. Plato’s argument here is completely vitiated by the ‘ambiguity of truth,’[1] and as it completely ignores the distinction made by the Protagoras Speech, it is a mere ignoratio elenchi. For ‘Protagoras’ has already explained how on his theory scientific authority was constituted. He could, therefore, reply—‘My dictum may be “true” (claim) for me, even though it is not “true” for all the world besides. There is no contradiction in this, for we are different. I am Protagoras: you, to put it mildly, are—not! And I may already be right, though no one else perceives it yet. For eventually men may come to see that my view is really “better”. And then the validity of the truth I now claim will be admitted.’

(5) In 171 E—172 C Plato propounds a restriction of the dictum’s claim to matters of sense-perception, exempting matters of health and disease from its sway, and he identifies this restricted claim with the position of the Protagoras Speech.

This passage, ᾑ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρᾳ, which has already been referred to (p. 14), at first sight seems direct evidence in favour of the view that the Speech is really a Platonic invention, and if this were the only or the best interpretation of the remark, it would be almost fatal to the contention of this study. But in point of fact it may be shown that it is only part of Plato’s misconstruction of the Speech, and that upon examination it tells strongly in favour of the view that the Speech is genuinely Protagorean and has been utterly misunderstood by Plato. To put the matter quite bluntly, it is not true that the Speech said what Plato’s ‘Socrates’ now says it said. The discrepancies between what was said and what is now alleged may doubtless look

  1. As I have shown in Studies in Humanism, pp. 145-46.