496 OTHO. ble, too, that the soldiers, who were then in heart before they were joined, would not be less so when the forces were all come up. Besides, the deferring battle could not be inconvenient to them that were sufficiently pro- vided with aU necessaries ; but the others, being in an enemy's country, must needs be exceedingly straitened in a little time. Marius Celsus was of Paulinus's opinion ; Annius Gallus, being absent and under the surgeon's hands through a fall from his horse, was consulted by let- ter, and advised Otho to stay for those legions that were marching from Moesia. But after all he did not follow the advice ; and the opinion of those that declared for a battle prevailed. There are several reasons given for this determination, but the most apparent is thisj that the prsetorian sol- diers, as they are called, who serve as guards, not relish- ing the military disciphne which they now had begun a little more to experience, and longing for their amuse- ments and unwarUl^e life among the shows of Rome, would not be commanded, but were eager for a battle, imagining that upon the first onset they should carry all before them. Otho also himself seems not to have shown the proper fortitude in bearing up against the uncer- tainty, and, out of effeminacy and want of use, had not patience for the calculations of danger, and was so uneasy at the apprehension of it, that he shut his eyes, and like one going to leap from a precipice, left every thing to fortune. TliLs is the account Secundus the rhetorician, who was his secretary, gave of the matter. But others would tell you that there were many movements in both armies for acting in concert ; and if it were possible for them to agree, then they should proceed to choose one of their most experienced officers that were present; if not, they should convene the senate, and invest it with the power of election. And it is not improbable that,
