are many States, and many persons in all States, to whom War seems by no means a considerable evil. To some persons and to some Governments occasional War seems, on the whole, to be more to be desired than the prospect of perpetual Peace, partly because of the coveted prizes which successful War may bring with it; and partly because of the enervating influences which unusually pacific pursuits are supposed, by some, to exercise on the national life.
It is not necessary to do more here than advert to these views This desire not universally strong. as phases of current opinion, though the weight they carry in the conduct of international politics is immense. If it is held that War is all but the greatest of disasters, for the occurrence of which no mere positive gain can ever compensate, albeit the desire to avoid imminent loss might justify the encountering of it, then the sharers in such an opinion may lend an attentive ear to the suggestion of measures which aim at the abolition of War, as a proper object for the concentration of political effort. But if War is looked upon as only a moderate evil, of an equal magnitude with a number of others, and one which may properly be regarded as a ready instrument, ever at hand, for the achievement of ulterior designs, or the satisfaction of a finely wrought national sensibility, then the consideration of remedies for War must be a fruitless inquiry. It would imply nothing less than an exact calculation, repeated for each State in succession, of the value of the different objects which modern civilized States may now, or at any future time, set before themselves, and an indication of the general line of policy which each State must adopt, so that, by a reconciliation of all the various lines, conflicts and disputes may become infrequent or impossible. Such an inquiry would involve a complete scheme of general European policy, stretching into the far future; and though the preparation of such a scheme would not in itself be impracticable — as the majestic efforts of M. Auguste Comte and his Eng-
