which are notoriously disposed to irregular encroachment on each other's territory, and partly in order to prevent, by an absolute limit, the absorption of the smaller States of Europe by a few States of inordinate magnitude. The general disposition manifested on so many sides to advance the formation of the kingdom of Italy, and to maintain its integrity, is similarly on a conscious or instinctive assurance that Italy, by its Alpine line of natural fortresses, and the opportunities for maritime warfare which its singular geographical position presents, would become an invaluable stronghold for any aspiring State which should succeed in occupying or annexing it. There has scarcely been a European War of moment in which some of the most decisive military operations have not been conducted on Italian soil.
These principles of policy have, indeed, some resemblance to the older one of the Balance of Power, differing from it, however, in the circumstances that no conscious attempt is made to maintain absolutely any existing status quo; nor is it the mere fact of the aggrandizement of a State already influential, even to a portentous extent, held to be a legitimate ground of remonstrance or interference. The present policy is far more negative than the older historical one, and takes up its stand on only a few very general and somewhat indefinite notions, such as those above mentioned in reference to Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and Italy.
Besides the more obvious tendencies here noted, there are, no doubt, at the present time other more or less distinct systems of policy, either actually operative on the minds of statesmen, or advocated by political speculators of various degrees of repute. This, there are many who speak of Germany being the "natural" ally of England; while others, such as the followers of Auguste Comte, believe that the true and only "natural" policy of England is to ally itself with France, and the Latin races generally, with the view of gradually founding a Republi-
