But, merely hinting these collateral criticisms, this reply is to be met by the demurrer that it is beside the question. If the sole thing meant is that sociological previsions can be approximate only if the thing denied is the possibility of reducing Sociology to the form of an exact science—then the rejoinder is, that the thing denied is a thing which no one has affirmed. Only a moiety of science is exact—science only phenomena of certain orders have had their relations developed from the qualitative form into the quantitative form. Of the remaining orders there are some produced by factors so numerous and so difficult to measure, that development of their relations into the quantitative form is extremely improbable, if not impossible. But these orders of phenomena are not therefore excluded from the conception of Science. In Geology, in Biology, in Psychology, most of the previsions are qualitative only; and where they are quantitative their quantitativeness, never quite definite, is mostly very indefinite. Nevertheless we unhesitatingly class these previsions as scientific. Similarly with Sociology. The phenomena it presents, involved in a higher degree than all others, are less than all other capable of precise treatment: such of them as can be generalized, can be generalized only within wide limits of variation as to time and amount; and there remains much that cannot be generalized. But, so far as there can be generalization, and so far as there can be interpretation based on it, so far there can be science. Whoever expresses political opinions—whoever asserts that such or such public arrangements will be beneficial or detrimental, tacitly expresses a belief in Social Science; for he asserts, by implication, that there is a natural sequence among social actions, and that, as the sequence is natural, results may be foreseen.
Reduced to a more concrete form, the case may be put thus: Mr. Froude and Canon Kingsley both believe to a considerable extent in the efficiency of legislation—probably to a greater extent than it is believed in by some of those who assert the existence of a Social Science. To believe in the efficiency of legislation is to believe that certain prospective penalties or rewards will act as deterrents or incentives—will modify individual conduct, and therefore modify social action. Though it may be impossible to say that a given law will produce a foreseen effect on a particular person, yet no doubt is felt that it will produce a foreseen effect on the mass of persons. Though Mr. Froude, when arguing against Mr. Buckle, says that he "would deliver himself from the eccentricities of this and that individual by a doctrine of averages," but that "unfortunately, the average of one generation need not be the average of the next;" yet Mr. Froude himself so far believes in the doctrine of averages as to hold that legislative interdicts, with threats of death or imprisonment behind them, will restrain the great majority of men in ways which can be predicted. While he contends that the results of individual will are incalculable, yet, by approving certain laws and condemning others, he tacitly
