at public expense, as a reward for their political work. This is the case particularly in the administration of municipal affairs. The national and State governments have been conducted, in spite of the observance of the odious spoils system, with an efficiency and economy unequaled by but few great business houses. Even better service would undoubtedly be obtained if the public had a fuller appreciation of the truth of the old paradox that the dearest labor is the cheapest. More liberal salaries for positions of trust and executive control would tend to elevate decidedly the standard and ability of the men in the public service. But, unfortunately, propositions of this character do not meet with general approval. The vulnerable spot of the American is his pocket-book. When an official lays his hands on that, the victim resents the attack with indignation, and submits, after loud protestations and threats, to the demand for his money, only out of respect for the superior power of the law. The dominant party, in attempting to carry on the government satisfactorily, and, at the same time, not arouse the voter who pays the taxes, has a difficult problem to solve. In the United States, where the voter is the ruler, political managers find it essential to continued success to make the drafts on the ruler's pocket-book as light as possible. All parties would be happy if the public treasury could be filled by the touch of a magician's wand, so that taxes might be abolished. But, as they are a necessary evil, a scheme of taxation without lamentation is what is wanted. In the law laid down by Professor William G. Sumner, that taxation tends to diffuse itself, but on the line of least resistance, is found a hint for the basis of this scheme. Turgot, the great French financier, expressed the politician's idea very tersely when he said that the science of taxation is to pluck the goose without making it cry. In hunting for the line of least resistance, and the most scientific methods of plucking, several interesting experiments have been made of late in different States, where new sources of revenue have been sought from special taxes on corporations, railroads, telegraph, telephone, and insurance companies, collateral inheritances, and other classes of property which can be plucked without producing a cry liable to strike a chord of sympathy in the popular heart. In most instances these experiments have surpassed in their results the expectations of the proposers. Large revenue has been obtained without provoking even a murmur of disapproval from the voting classes. In Vermont, for example, no direct tax was levied in 1883 and 1884, the receipts under the corporation tax law paying the expenses of the State government. The Comptroller of New York received $9,569,161.35 in 1884, of which $1,603,612.75 were paid by corporations. Last year,[1] although the Wisconsin Legislature authorized a levy of 1240,000, the State Treasurer was not obliged to collect any direct tax, as the license-tax from railroads, insurance, telegraph, and telephone companies was sufficient to meet the current expenses. The Treasurer
- ↑ 1884. The article was written June, 1885.
