bilities," was an extension and application of the principles of the first treatise to immediate practical questions and measures which are occupying the general attention of the public. That discussion led to the present book on "Class-Interests," which, indeed, was originally intended to be published as a part of the volume on "Reforms," as a final application of his systematic views.
Nevertheless, the author's original studies in the antagonisms of things, and the limits to accomplishment which these antagonisms imply, seem to have been wholly insufficient to neutralize the bias of temperament or the power of preconceived convictions. He avows that the results of his studies bring him into "accord with wide-spread movements of thought and action in this country and in Europe"; and of these he refers, first and in particular, to "the amplification of government functions"—that is, he joins the swelling crowd of those who are looking for salvation from social evils to the politicians. For, say what we will, the fact remains that what we have actually to deal with as government is simply the men who have possession of political power, and, under our representative system, they are the selected and successful demagogues of the community. Our legislators, as a mass, who constitute the working power of government, are neither the wise men nor the good men of society, but men who are incompetent for their task—men without knowledge of the subjects upon which they are required to act, sordid and ambitious self-seekers, in short, office-holders and politicians who have beat all rivals. The "amplification of government functions" means, therefore, simply committing more and more the great interests of society to incompetent and untrustworthy hands. Our author condemns laissez faire, and makes the serious mistake, usual with the party of interference, of affirming that it is a "do-nothing" policy; whereas that is the only school we now have which aims to hold government to its supreme work of administering justice in society. But that great object is now so overlaid with added "functions" as to be buried out of sight and forgotten, so that those who demand that, first of all, government shall enforce it among citizens, are charged with being in favor of "doing nothing."
The present volume is profoundly sympathetic with the needs of the masses of the people, and it closes with a very valuable essay on moral education in our primary schools, which ought to be extensively read.
Problems in Philosophy. By John Bascom, author of "Science of Mind": "Growth and Grades of Intelligence." New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Pp. 222. Price, $1.50.
The more obscure and refractory problems in philosophy are here dealt with in a series of essays, each of quite moderate length. To the presumption, nowadays so strong, that such collections of articles are apt to originate in the idea of "gathering up everything, that nothing be lost," the author replies that in this case the work is essentially new, as but one essay, that on "Liberty," has appeared elsewhere, while that has been somewhat modified. The discussions have been kept within marked limits of brevity, the writer assures us, with the view of securing an explicit statement of a few fundamental principles, and to avoid the evils of excessive elaboration which are so incident to systematic treatises on philosophy.
Dr. Bascom has here reviewed a considerable number of the most knotty questions that have been held as at the foundation of philosophy, and that have for many ages exercised the ingenuity of speculative inquirers. Among the problems considered will be found "The Relativity of Knowledge," "Spontaneity and Causation," "Freedom of Will," "Consciousness and Space," "Universality of Law," "Being," and "Final Causes." The author seems to have but little sympathy with those who hold that the human mind is shut out from any final solution of these problems. He belongs to the intuitionalist school of metaphysics, which resists the efforts of the empirical or scientific party to set limits to knowledge and to the powers of the mind. In his essay on "The Relativity of Knowledge," while not at all denying the principle, he condemns the sweeping conclusions that many have been disposed to draw from it, saying, "Relativity as a self evident and
