Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 33.djvu/488

ficial ends in view. Nor must conduciveness to social ameliorations, present or future, be taken into account when we attempt to conceive a good will. In short we are to frame our idea of a good will without any material out of which to frame the idea of good: good is to be used in thought as an eviscerated term.

Here, then, we have illustrated what I have called above the inverted a priori method of philosophizing: the setting out with an inconceivable proposition. The Kantian Metaphysics starts by asserting that Space is "nothing but" a form of intuition—pertains wholly to the subject and not at all to the object. This is a verbally intelligible proposition but one of which the terms can not be put together in consciousness; for neither Kant, nor any one else, has ever succeeded in bringing into unity of representation the thought of Space and the thought of Self, as being the one an attribute of the other. And here we see that, just in the same way, the Kantian Ethics begins by positing something which seems to have a meaning but which has really no meaning—something which, under the conditions imposed, can not be rendered into thought at all. For neither he, nor any one else, ever has or ever can, frame a consciousness of a good will when from the word good are expelled all thoughts of those ends which we distinguish by the word good.

 

Evidently Kant himself sees that his assumption invites attack, for he proceeds to defend it. He says:

"There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, [!] yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of high-flown fancy, &c." (p. 13).

And then to prepare for a justification, he goes on to say:

"In the physical constitution of an organized being we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose" (pp. 13-14).

Now, even had this assumption been valid, the argument based upon it, far-fetched as it is, might be considered of very inadequate strength to warrant the supposition that there can be a will conceived as good without any reference to good ends. But, unfortunately for Kant, the assumption is utterly invalid. In his day, it probably passed without question; but in our day, few if any biologists would admit it. On the special-creation hypothesis some defense of the proposition might be attempted, but the evolution hypothesis tacitly negatives it entirely. Let us begin with some minor facts which militate against Kant's supposition. Take first rudimentary organs. These are numerous throughout the animal kingdom. While representing organs which were of use