motion universally are curiously limited to the conception of impact. Although, the influence of the metaphysics of the middle ages is nominally discarded by modern scientists, yet that influence is distinctly traced in their modern seeking after the absolute in time, space, and motion. This, too, while it is clear that relativity is the law of both nature and thought. Judge Stallo concludes his book with a caustic criticism of the theory that space can exist in more than three dimensions. That theory he shows to involve the attribution to space of the very properties by the absence of which alone it is distinguishable from matter. He avers the search for properties in space, pseudo-sphericity and the like, to be without warrant from physics, mathematics, or logic.
While thus subjecting modern hypotheses to radical and often adverse criticism. Judge Stallo never for a moment drops into an injudicial tone. Such partial and tentative value as these hypotheses may possess he cheerfully accords them, but he maintains that the progress of individual sciences has far outstripped the unifying power of a philosophy whose roots are imbedded in ancient and discredited metaphysics. Throughout his life the themes treated in the "Concepts"' have occupied the author's mind, and been the objects of his study. He may in the future present further consideration of the fundamental problems of scientific philosophy, as a sequel to the "Concepts."
It was to be expected that such a volume as the "Concepts" should have a noteworthy reception in the world of science, and at the hands of leading reviewers. Mr. A. W. Reinhold, in the London "Academy," commended it highly. So did "The American Engineer's" critic. Prof. Tait, in "Nature," and the reviewers of the "Critic" and the "Nation," did not admire its analysis, or deem its conclusions sound.
A close friend of Judge Stallo's, who has furnished us with an analysis of his character—Mr. C. H. Goddard, of Marietta, Ohio—credits him with great facility in turning from the study of one thing to the study of another; in learning retentively all kinds of facts, principles, opinions, hypotheses, and words; in analyzing these and using the results of his analyses; and in expression, whether by speech or in writing; "but only an intimate friend," he adds, "could appreciate the seemingly effortless impulse with which he has done the most that he has accomplished outside of his legal practice." He is distinguished among his friends by the breadth of his sympathies, and this is exemplified in many personal and patriotic attachments, and acts growing out of them; in freedom from envy or jealousy, and in the catholicity of his æsthetic tastes; but in nothing more than in his love for knowledge and for rational freedom. Of these, his love for rational freedom
