I am not alone in my view of Mr. Spencer'a teaching upon this point. In his criticism of The Kan versus the State, in The Popular Science Monthly, vol. xxvii, p. 170, Prof. de Laveleye says, "The law that Mr. Herbert Spencer desires to adopt is simply Darwin's law—the survival of the fittest." On page 172, after citing a passage explaining the manner in which natural selection among animals is accomplished, M. de Laveleye adds, "This is the ideal order of things which, we are told, ought to prevail in human societies." In his Rejoinder Mr. Spencer evades this by saying that his Social Statics was written in 1851, while Darwin's Origin of Species was written in 1859. This is satisfactory so far as the expression "survival of the fittest" is especially "Darwin's law," but the principle is involved in the operation of the "large, far-seeing benevolence" which kills off the weak and helpless, by whatever name it is designated. Mr. Spencer docs not seem to complain of M. de Laveleye's imputation, if the latter means "the survival of the industrially superior, and those who are fittest for the requirements of social life." I understand Mr. Spencer to oppose carrying the struggles of the "tooth and claw" period into our industrial era, but that he is willing to permit the operation of the principle of natural selection with more civilized weapons.
In his Rejoinder to M. de Laveleye, Mr. Spencer, after speaking of the distribution of aid by the Government, says, "If others, in their private capacities, are prompted by affection to pity or to mitigate the evil results, by all means let them do so"; but this assumes the tone of mere sufferance when he immediately adds: "No power can equitably prevent them from making efforts, or giving money, to diminish the sufferings of the unfortunate and the inferior; at the same time that no power can equitably coerce them into doing so." I understand this to mean that there is no right in the state to interfere with private charity, if any one is moved to it. In another place Mr. Spencer says (p. 189), "Without wishing to restrain philanthropic action, but quite contrariwise, I have in various places argued that philanthropy will better achieve its ends by nongovernmental means than by governmental means." I understand by this that Mr. Spencer has no wish to "restrain" philanthropy, and he believes the voluntary form better than the compulsory; but he does not claim any wish to promote charity, and the kind of "philanthropy" he has in mind seems to be only such as is consistent with his other doctrines. As he views it, true philanthropy is best expressed by non-interference. The greatest happiness is worked out by the law of consequences, which in reality is a "large, far-seeing benevolence." "Inevitably, then, this law in conformity with which each member of a species takes the consequences of its own nature; and In virtue of which the progeny of each member, participating in its nature, also takes such consequences: is one that tends ever to raise the aggregate happiness of the species by furthering the multiplication of the happier and hindering that of the less happy. All this is true of human beings as of other beings" (Data of Ethics, p. 190).
I have tried to present the grounds on which my statement regarding Mr. Spencer rests. I think he means to encourage self-reliance as the primary virtue of humanity, and that he seriously believes that what is known in the world as "charity" weakens it. The question is not now whether he is right or wrong, but whether or not this is his teaching. I am aware that my words can be so interpreted as to represent Mr. Spencer as indifferent to human beings other than himself, but that is not my meaning. He distinguishes between acting "to the detriment of others" and acting "without active concern for others" (Data of Ethics, p. 227), and I use the words "without concern for others" in his own sense. If you think the word "active" modifies the meaning in any important way, I am willing to introduce it in my sentence, if I can be assured that "concern," which is but passive and not active, has any meaning. Otherwise the expression "active concern" is a pleonasm.
Mr. Spencer's doctrine is, as I interpret it, that, if each looks out well for himself, then all will be happy, at least as soon as "adaptation" has been realized; and until it has, no amount of solicitude for others or sacrifice in their behalf can possibly realize their happiness.
| Very respectfully yours, |
| David J. Hill. |
| University of Rochester, Rochester, N. Y., April 12, 1890. |
THE SUSPENSION BRIDGE.
Editor Popular Science Monthly:
Sir: In reply to the letter of Mr. Gustav Lindenthal (vol. xxxvi, page 844), criticising my remarks as to the lack of stability of suspension bridges (page 478), I would like to make the following statement:
I do not consider it at all necessary that my remarks upon any of the different types of bridges should be followed by the words "as usually built," as, from the title of the article, The Evolution of the Modern Railway Bridge, I could not possibly refer to any mode of construction other than that in general use or some antiquated method.
I did refer to the suspension bridge as "usually built," and as such it is very deficient in rigidity, and in practice it has been found almost impossible to so brace it laterally and vertically as to render it in any way a desirable bridge for the passage of our modern heavy trains at a high rate of speed.
I refer simply to the suspension bridge up to its present point of evolution, both as
