regards the subject from the psychological and not from the metaphysical point of view. It is with him a question of science rather than of philosophy, and this circumstance gives especial interest to his views. We have had abundant philosophical disquisition upon this subject, and it is refreshing to be told by a man of science just how the case stands as a matter of knowledge.
Although psychology is not a part of philosophy, yet Prof. Höffding teaches that philosophical thought, as a form of mental activity, lies within the sphere of its observation. Without making any assertions about the absolute nature of mental life, or whether such a nature exists, psychology can bring a knowledge of mental phenomena, of their mutual relations and their laws of development, as a contribution to the general conception of the universe; and such a conception, framed in accordance with experience, should be able to clear the point of view and to correct many prejudices.
In treating of the Interrelation of Mind and Body, Prof. Höffding accordingly examines briefly, but with care and penetration, the hypotheses that have been framed to explain the connection between conscious life and the life of the brain. He proceeds entirely from the point of view of experiential psychology, and with no reference to a final philosophy—believing that we only reach the metaphysical point of view when experience has been thoroughly explored and its tendencies have been determined.
We give the following extended extract from Prof. Höffding's work, both on account of its intrinsic interest and as an example of his style and mode of treating the subject. Allowing due weight to all the facts brought forward concerning the relations of mind and body, he says: "Only four possibilities can be conceived: (a) either consciousness and brain, mind and body, act one upon the other as two distinct beings or substances (dualism);
(b) or mind is only a from or a product of the body (materialism);
(c) or the body is only a form or a product of one or several mental beings (idealism or monistic spiritualism); (d) or, finally, mind and body, consciousness and brain, are evolved as different forms of expression of one and the same being." In examining these several possibilities Prof. Höffding repeats that, whichever we may prefer, we can adopt it only as a provisional hypothesis and not as a final philosophical or metaphysical theory; our only concern being to learn what is the view of experiential science.
He enters upon the subject of dualism by asking: "Does an excitation of a sense-organ, when transmitted to the brain, pass into sensation? Does our will set the body in motion? What is the relation between states of consciousness and brain processes? The ordinary notion is that the mind acts upon the body and the body upon the mind" He has elsewhere sagely remarked that
